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One might be a ﬁne physician or nurse even if one does not
know why one is. One might, for instance, be good, excellent or
even brilliant at making inferences from signs and symptoms to
diagnoses, but be utterly unable to articulate the rules of logic that
underlie those inferences. One might, while we are at it, be able to
kick a ball toward a goal while having no idea about the physics of
ball-kicking. The ancient Greeks called the former technê and the
latter epistêmê. We call them ‘‘knowing how’’ and ‘‘knowing that.’’
This is a fragment of a large and longstanding area of inquiry, and
there are several views about the relationship between technê and
epistêmê and howmuch the former depends on the latter. Thinking
about that relationship, inquiring after the foundations of medical
knowledge, seeking clarity about the logical underpinnings of diag-
nosis and discovering the best ethical reasons in support of actions
by clinicians are some of the issues addressed in the intellectual
project we have come to call the ‘‘philosophy of medicine.’’
It is a large project, and Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh has put his shoul-
der to the wheel with no little passion. The result is this interest-
ingly mistitled paving stone of a volume which, at 1133 pages,
24  16  5 cm and nearly 2.3 kilos is not a handbook (which
one ought perhaps to be able to hold easily in one hand) as much
as an encyclopedia. ‘‘Paving stone’’ is intended as compliment in
that it suggests something essential to a path, which others inter-
ested in the topic will need to traverse one way or another, at least
for a while. Sadegh-Zadeh’s aim is to be comprehensive and intro-
ductory. This is breathtakingly difﬁcult, and he succeeds more of-
ten than not. When he does, in describing the inessential and
inescapable moral or deontic foundations of medical practice, for
instance, he does a great service. When he does not, in an elucida-
tion of the patient as a ‘‘bio-psycho-social agent’’ using a hyper-
bolic and sometimes precious formalism, say, he makes clear this
is a book for philosophical sub-subspecialists – which is too bad.
There is much of great value here, but those without a love, taste
or stomach for formal logic will be left in the dust. A philosopher
and physician, Sadegh-Zadeh does not merely use logic or even
rely on it. This work threads or imbues every issue and topic with
logic and associated formalisms. ‘‘For those readers who are not ac-
quainted with logic,’’ he offers, implying that mere acquaintance
will be adequate to the task here, ‘‘a logic primer is provided in
the ﬁnal part of the book’’ (p. 8). The primer comprises a ﬁfth of
the volume. Studying it ﬁrst, as advised, will daunt as many read-
ers as it will guide. Neither is that a criticism – just a very impor-
tant signpost for most of those who will ﬁnd it an exceedingly
challenging journey. Moreover, it is a journey likely to be enjoyed
only by the most dedicated and inquisitive members of the infor-
matics community.
The book has eight Parts (including Part VIII, ‘‘Logical Funda-
mentals), composed of 30 chapters. Part I, ‘‘The Language ofMedicine,’’ addresses medical syntax, semantics, pragmatics and
concept formation – making it clear at the beginning that the
author seeks to be comprehensive, even if that means breezy
asides on Wittgenstein and language games and Austin and Searle
on speech acts – two of the most important topics in contemporary
philosophy of language.
Part II, ‘‘Medical Praxiology,’’ which is an unembarrassedly
fancy way of saying medical ‘‘practice’’ or ‘‘action,’’ ranges across
patients, health, disease, symptoms, etiology, clinical encounters,
diagnosis, prognosis, therapy and prevention. These are enough
topics for a dozen books on the philosophy of medicine. Here, it
is a view of medical practice that grounds it as never before in
the formal structures of the propositional calculus. This will either
exhilarate or frustrate the reader, according as she wants to em-
brace the logic or not. While this grounding is essential to Sade-
gh-Zadeh’s plan, it comes at a price: one of the largest and most
interesting challenges in contemporary philosophy of medicine
and bioethics is the distinction between ‘‘traits’’ and ‘‘maladies.’’
The distinction matters a great deal in a post-genomic world when
we need greater clarity in distinguishing between genetic
enhancement and gene therapy. But the trait-malady distinction
is given a mere peck on the cheek here, when it would have been
reasonable to have hoped for a warmer embrace.
In Part III, ‘‘Medical Epistemology,’’ Sadegh-Zadeh walks us
through a century of analytic philosophy as applied to medicine.
The architecture, types, semantics and pragmatics of medical
knowledge all lead to a fascinating view that ‘‘experimental-scien-
tiﬁc knowledge. . . is more and more becoming an analog of techni-
cal products such as automobiles, shoes, and socks.’’ Moreover,
‘‘Like these objects, it is increasingly being engineered by machines
in specialized factories called research laboratories’’ and that infor-
mation technology is linking these factories (p. 531). The upshot is
the Global Knowledge-Making Engine, a network of ‘‘epistemic
machines’’ industrializing knowledge such that ‘‘in the not-too-
distant future. . . it will be pointless to ask whether such an indus-
trial product does or does not possess epistemological properties
such as truth, falsehood, truthlikeness, probability, justiﬁedness,
credibility, reliability, plausibility, etc. The product will simply be
handled as a modularized, portable and copyable commodity,
and applied according to its expected utility’’ (p. 551). That is,
the point of medical epistemology is (or was) somehow to make
itself inessential: What laboratories discover and doctors use is
not true or false or correct or not, but that which seems to work.
He names this ‘‘technoconstructivism,’’ and it is an interesting
and provocative theory.
Part IV – ‘‘Morality, Ethics, and Deontics’’ – is the volume’s
shortest chapter, but it lays the framework for the claim that med-
icine is a ‘‘deontic discipline’’ – that is, that medicine is at ground
about duty, and the clariﬁcation of what is obligatory, forbidden,
and permitted. Indeed, these are the main concepts in deontic lo-
gic, which is addressed in Part VIII. Along the way, however, a
number of new entities (including ‘‘deontic things’’) are
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not clear they are essential to the project. Moreover, given the
importance of ethics in other accounts of the philosophy of medi-
cine, it is disconcerting to be referred from this brief section to Part
VI for a chapter titled ‘‘Medicine is Practiced Morality, as well as
Ethics’’ (pp. 777 ff.). This idea is important and worthy of greater
attention and elucidation.
The author’s love of logical formalisms shapes this volume, but
‘‘Medical Logic’’ (Part V) has long been a core component of any
comprehensive treatment of philosophy of medicine. This part,
comprising the sections ‘‘Logic in Medicine’’ and ‘‘Logic of Medi-
cine,’’ makes the signiﬁcant and worrisome claim that ‘‘The fact
that modern medicine has neglected logic in medical practice re-
search and philosophy, is one of the reasons why the artiﬁcial
intelligence of computer technology is more and more taking over
the reasoning responsibility in medicine’’ (p. 588). This notion –
the science of artiﬁcial intelligence has thrived because medical
students and physicians do not know enough logic – is bad news
for health informatics. In Sadegh-Zadeh’s view, physicians
‘‘increasingly hand over their reasoning responsibilities to ma-
chines that are steadily acquiring medical intelligence’’ (p. 588).
Later, in Part VI, on ‘‘Medical Metaphysics,’’ he unleashes a torrent
of criticism against artiﬁcial intelligence in medicine, ‘‘clinical
decision engineering’’ and ‘‘health engineering.’’ For instance,
‘‘the software products of this new research and technology are
more and more invading clinical decision-making and patient
management’’ (p. 784); ‘‘clinical judgment is more and more being
engineered today’’ (p. 785); and all of this is leading, ‘‘in collabora-
tion with other technological branches, to posthumanism that is
characterized by the supremacy of machine over man’’ (p. 785).
Now, this sounds quite dire, but it is found in this distinguished
scholar’s work over many decades. It might serve to explain the
extensive and sometimes unnecessary use of logic and its formal-
isms: if a man can calculate anything, then humans retain primacy
over machines. It means that Sadegh-Zadeh in this gigantic logic
book might be attempting to perform a public service for
humanity.
Part VII, ‘‘Epilog,’’ tries to make good on a tacit presumption
that medicine is in fact a science. Here, it is argued that medicine
is a kind of super-science that combines theoretical, practical anddeontic sciences. It also includes a number of restatements of his
distinctive brand of skepticism: ‘‘Medical-empirical knowledge is
therefore not deductively justiﬁable by experience (p. 801) . . . con-
ﬁrmation also does not work (p. 801) ... Distinct languages that one
may use are distinct perspectives (p. 809) . . . no perspective can be
identiﬁed as ‘the right one’ to produce ‘the true picture. . .’ (p. 809).
Put differently, ‘‘knowing that’’ is impossible, leaving us only with
‘‘knowing how.’’ This is a pity, since technê is what the AI robots
will likely excel at.
At the end of the day, it is a robust relativism that owes much to
a particular kind of logic – fuzzy logic. The section on fuzzy logic in
Part VIII, ‘‘Logical Fundamentals,’’ the book-within-a-book appen-
dix, makes the case that many concepts in medicine are vague,
imprecise, and so on, and that these properties are why a logic of
fuzziness is apt. Fuzzy logic, like other logics with more than two
truth values (i.e., ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘false’’) are in fact quite interesting
and worthy of extended study. One might have hoped for temper-
ance in making the case, but this defender of an alternative ap-
proach to reasoning himself is responding to fuzzy logic’s critics:
‘‘Some are even vituperatively hostile toward it . . . because it devi-
ates from their out-dated understanding of logic . . . it is for several
reasons the best logic for use in medicine’’ (p. 994).
While that sounds mean, and while its conclusion is an asser-
tion about which reasonable people might disagree, this is never-
theless a large and worthy project, in part because it includes
most if not all of the traditional branches of philosophy: logic, epis-
temology, ethics, and so on. A new take on old stuff is almost al-
ways to be prized. One might wish that this effort were more
clearly located in or against the constellation of other works on
the philosophy of medicine, but the goals here are distinctive: doc-
ument a distinctive career; draw together a variety of approaches,
posits and theories; and strive to systematize it all. This is not a
book to read, but a path – a difﬁcult path – to explore.
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